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1Chapter
State Capitalism in Belarus: 
Behind Economic Anemia
Kiryl Rudy
Abstract
Belarus’ economic model looked rather successful in the late 1990s and in the 
2000s with its economic growth above 7% per year. But during the last decade, 
Belarusian annual economic growth has fallen at the average level around 1% per 
year. This chapter reveals the rarely known case of state capitalism in this post-Soviet 
country with its specific indicators, and instruments behind economic anemia. It also 
outlines several traps on the way of Belarusian economic growth: “debt trap,” “middle-
income trap,” “social burden trap,” “resource curse trap,” “conflict neighbors trap,” and 
“forceful pressure trap.” These pitfalls lead to the long-term economic slowdown in 
the Republic of Belarus. The consequences of such economic anemia bring to another 
discussion about the role of public values in support of state capitalism in Belarus.
Keywords: transition economy, economic development, growth
1. Introduction
Belarus is the former Soviet Union republic with the inherited economic structure 
and un-reformed government management. In the 1990s, this medium-sized European 
country took its first steps on its own, and it has spent the intervening decades sticking 
closely to the choices it made then. The Belarusian economy was naturally evolving. 
The private sector was developing, and small business as well as the service industry 
was growing. On the other hand, the efforts being made to preserve old state-owned 
manufacturing and the mobilization model were limiting the economy’s flexibility.
In the last decade, Belarusian economy skidded to a near-complete halt. Budget 
spending, devaluations, and debt no longer help fuel economic growth. The system 
of incentives in place for state-owned enterprises is holding back initiative and 
innovation, and the continuous flow of state capital conceals mistakes in manage-
ment. But the problem runs deeper: the consistently preferential treatment enjoyed 
by the public sector drives costs higher and keeps market resources out of the hands 
of the private sector, strangling its development as well. All of that saps energy and 
enthusiasm in the country and throws it to the long-term economic anemia.
State capitalism in Belarus has its own logic, a clear desire to keep (even by force) 
the inherited structure and system of management. That gives a mental support 
point, instills self-confidence, and permissiveness. Currently, there are no economic 
reforms to boost growth in political agenda. Manual management of the economy is 
so overwhelming that it leaves neither strength nor time for strategic decisions, and 
with the new generation has come a shift from nostalgia—a tendency to look for 
the future in the past—to uncertainty. The lack of reforms is also explained by an 
unwillingness to take responsibility for the social fallout. That psychological barrier 
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can only be overcome by recognizing the inevitability of transformation; it is self-
awakening that will illuminate the path forward for reforms.
This chapter includes several parts. The next one provides overview of state 
capitalism in Belarus, its indicators, and instruments. Another one describes pitfalls 
faced by state capitalism in Belarus and the reasons behind its economic anemia. 
The last one shows how Belarusian state capitalism is supported by the public during 
economic growth, and how public values are transformed during economic anemia.
2. State capitalism in Belarus: overview of indicators and instruments
The Republic of Belarus features an unstable hybrid economy. On the one hand, 
the country features state ownership of large swaths of property, administrative 
(manual) control over state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks, directed 
lending, consolidated budgetary resources, and wide social security. On the other, it 
has its entrepreneurs, small and medium businesses, private and foreign businesses, 
an international banking sector, a free-floating exchange rate, market prices, 
elements of a public-private partnership, a functioning Hi-Tech Park, an industrial 
park “Great Stone,” free economic zones, and other aspects of a market economy.
The hybrid regime of the Belarusian economy sometimes reminds of other 
countries: modern Russia [1], other post-Soviet countries [2], and China at one 
point in its development [3]. The resemblance is especially clear when talking about 
the active role played by the government in a market economy, something gener-
ally referred to as state capitalism [4]. State capitalism is understood here to be an 
economy in which the state plays the main role as entrepreneur, employer, owner of 
the means of production, and profit allocator.
Belarus’ state capitalism can be described through six indicators how the state 
intervenes in the economy, and how the capital is distributed.
1. Public expenditures to GDP: This indicator shows how consolidated budget-
ary funds are in an economy. In Belarus in 2010–2019, they were at an average 
around 30% of GDP, though adding in social security pushes that number to 
an internationally recognized 40% of GDP. Budget is the main tool and indica-
tor of state capitalism in Belarus. It redistributes much higher share of capital 
in economy by way of comparison with other countries: Central and Eastern 
Europe registered at 34%; and Brazil, India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
South Africa at an average of 22% [5].
2. Tax burden: Belarus enjoys a lighter tax burden than many developed countries. 
In 2019 tax revenue, including social spending, came to 37% of GDP. Tax bur-
den, without social spending, was 25% in 2019 and stayed flat since 2016 [6].
Developed countries saw that same number range from 33 to 55% from 2000 to 
2019. Interestingly, from 1870 to 1910 in developed countries, it was as low as 
7–8% and was sufficient for governments to pay for security, legal systems, foreign 
services, and everything else the public needed [7]. The growth in tax revenue ex-
perienced by those countries since then has primarily served to cover spending on 
social programs and infrastructure. For the same reason, Belarus has a fairly high 
tax burden, with around 12% of GDP going to social security.
3. Money supply to GDP: In Belarus, the ratio of money supply (aggregator 
M2) to GDP is quite low around 16% in 2019, especially if it is compared with 
Chinese indicator of more than 200%, or Russian—around 60%. This ratio has 
been increasing in Belarus annually with the speed of 13% in 2016 to 18% in 
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2019, but still lower than in 1996–2015 with the spread from 20 to 60% in-
crease in different years, which boost double-digit inflation, rapid devaluation, 
and economic growth.
4. Banking assets to GDP: Banks are usually the significant elements of state capi-
talism in different countries. For example, the share of banking assets to GDP 
in Russia is around 90%; in China, it is almost 300% [8].
However, the banking system in Belarus does not satisfy the country’s economic 
needs, meaning that is suffers from chronic undercapitalization. In 2013, the 
Belarusian banking system commanded assets equaling a bit more than 60% of 
GDP; in 2019–20, it is 57%.
5. Financial market to GDP: Due to the lack of privatization and relatively small 
number of private enterprises in Belarus, national financial market is rather underde-
veloped. In 2019, the capitalization of Belarusian financial market to GDP was 22.6%, 
including stock market to GDP was only 0.6%.
By the comparison of state capitalism in China, this indicator was more than 
100% to GDP there in 2019, and stock market capitalization was 46.5% falling 
from 71.7% in 2017.
6. Foreign direct investments to GDP: As the important source to finance 
balance of payments and economic growth, foreign direct investments 
inflow in Belarus were at the average annual level around 2.3% to GDP in 
2016–2019. This ratio is similar to Chinese one in recent years, but not in the 
2000–2010 when it overcame 4%.
According to the estimation of Economy Research Institute of the Ministry of Econ-
omy of Belarus in 2015, USD 9.3–9.6 billion of foreign direct investments are to be 
mobilized in 2016–2020 on a net basis to attain the GDP growth of 10–15% over the 
5 years (2–3% per year). In fact, USD 5.2 billion of foreign direct investments were 
attracted in 2016–2019, and GDP growth was on the average level of 1.1% per year.
The main two instruments of state capitalism in Belarus are state-owned enter-
prises and state-owned banks.
2.1 State-owned enterprises in Belarus
From the Soviet times, it is believed in Belarus that economy could be run as if 
it were a single state-owned corporation and thus managed more efficiently. The 
government participates in the day-to-day management of individual state-owned 
companies by setting goals, approving business plans, helping organize sales, 
unloading warehouses, continually monitoring operations, attracting financing for 
agriculture, and running social projects, sports, and more.
State and local authorities often serve as anti-crisis managers, actively interven-
ing and periodically offering support to state-owned firms. For example, in 2015, 
the government and the National Bank (central bank of Belarus) took control of 
the business plans for 106 of them with the heaviest external debt burdens. Anti-
crisis management encompasses the use of a number of financial tools: tax breaks, 
short-term loans, debt restructuring, loan servicing, and more. The problem is that 
a conflict of interests necessarily arises between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministries responsible for a particular state enterprise.
The government not only provides financial support but also requests additional 
financial payments besides taxes from the profitable state-owned enterprises. In 
Public Sector Crisis Management
4
2005, Belarus has founded a targeted national development fund. It accumulates 
capital from revenue appropriated from highly profitable state-owned enterprises 
based on their yearly results. The list of firms and the amount appropriated are set 
each year. In 2020, 40 state-owned enterprises redirected part of their earnings to 
the fund, and the primary contribution, which was made by the Belarusian Potash 
Company, made it based on raw materials. However, the fact that contributions are 
made by state-owned enterprises unrelated to raw materials weakens their incentive 
to boost productivity. The fund also receives foreign-denominated contributions 
earned by selling state-owned shares to foreign investors.
The focus of the Belarusian government on the state-owned enterprises put the 
doubts on the efficiency of such management system as this sector covers only half of 
national GDP. The similar share of state-owned enterprises around 50% to GDP is in 
Russian state capitalism. In China, state-owned companies take up only around 30% 
of GDP [9]. Another way of looking at this issue is to evaluate the other contributions 
of state-owned enterprise in Belarus: to foreign exchange earnings (about 30% in 
2019), industry production (73.3%), retail turnover (16.2%), and revenue (58%) [10].
The close relationship between public and private business in Belarus makes it 
difficult to objectively determine the role played by the public side of that partnership 
independent of its private counterpart. State-owned enterprises support an entire eco-
system comprised of hundreds of smaller state-owned, private, and foreign suppliers, 
contractors, and intermediaries. In keeping with international terminology, companies 
critical to the economy vis-à-vis manufacturing, taxes, exports, and employment are 
designated “national champions.” However, the fact that they are occasionally forced to 
lay off employees, reduce production, and rely on tax breaks to maintain competitive-
ness means that the list of Belarusian national champions sometimes changes.
The role of state-owned enterprises in job creation deserves a separate look due 
to its economic and social importance for Belarus. State-owned companies made 
up 43.4% of employment in Belarus as of January 1, 2020, 39% of employment in 
Russia, and 19% of employment in China. The high percentage of employment 
generated by state-owned companies in Belarus is in large measure due to how con-
nected they are to individual cities, something left over from the Soviet Union. From 
a social point of view that makes them essential and from an economic point of view, 
it keeps labor resources sticky and puts a damper on overall labor productivity across 
wide swaths of territory. High employment at state enterprises in Belarus can be seen 
as providing social security in the form of guaranteed jobs (lifetime employment). 
However, companies incapable of holding up on their own under intense competi-
tion cannot provide that security to their employees. Counting on the government to 
continually prop them up can distort public finances and lead to problems for other 
public services, also preventing manpower from migrating to industries character-
ized by higher added value and stronger economic growth.
2.2 State-owned banks in Belarus
The lion’s share of the Belarusian banking system is occupied by two state-
owned banks: Belarusbank and Belagroprombank. They participate in state 
programs and offer state support, commanding a monopoly of the banking system 
vis-à-vis assets (62.2% between them as of April 1, 2020) and capital (60.4%) [11].
The low profitability that comes with state programs and support ranks state-
owned banks among the country’s worst large banks in terms of asset profitability 
and capital. As of January 1, 2020 the profitability of assets after taxes of state-owned 
banks in Belarus was 1.3%. The same indicator of the banks with foreign capital in 
Belarus was 2.3%, and the banks with private national capital—3.9%. In general, it is 
necessary to mention that banks with foreign capital play important role in economic 
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growth of Belarus as they fuel the money in the fast-growing private and interna-
tional companies in the country. As of January 1, 2020 the foreign-capital banks’ 
assets was 34.6% to Belarus’ GDP, and their capital was 34.9% to GDP. It is different 
from other state capitalism models. In China, these indicators are not higher than 2%.
Administrative meddling in the day-to-day operations of state banks by over-
sight boards often leads to directed lending that does not take the bank’s reserves 
into consideration, creating liquidity issues. Directed lending also relieves banks of 
responsibility for channeling funds to underperforming projects. When the general 
economic situation worsens or revenue dries up, companies no longer have the abil-
ity to service the loans held by banks. The continually changing outlook also ensures 
a constant stream of bank customers switching their accounts to and from rubles 
as well as into and out of the banking system, draining bank reserves. All those 
factors intensify the systemic risks faced by banks, and a state infusion of capital or 
moving toxic assets to the Development Bank or public debt when directed lending 
is relaxed serves as only a temporary reprieve for the banking system.
In 2011, the Development Bank of Belarus was founded as a non-banking insti-
tution designed to improve the economic performance of government investment 
programs. From December 2011 to June 2013, Belarusbank and Belagroprombank 
handed over some of their state program assets to the newly founded institution, 
altogether totaling more than 12 trillion rubles. They did hold onto some old loans 
and continue lending directly to government programs.
As of 2019 an old mechanism for funding state programs in Belarus was still 
in place, though it keeps the Development Bank from being able to perform its 
primary function. If that mechanism changes or a competitive, a result-based 
approach is taken to distributing funds, the Development Bank can transition to 
the traditional format employed by development banks in other countries (for 
example, in Germany, China, and Russia). The Belarusian Development Bank 
could then focus on providing export finance, financing major infrastructure 
projects, supporting small and medium business, and others of the country’s 
priority goals.
Thus, state capitalism in Belarus characterized by high level of public expendi-
tures to GDP, medium tax burden, decreased monetization of GDP, undercapital-
ized banking system, underdeveloped financial market, and low inflow of foreign 
direct investments. Its main tools are state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
banks. However, state capitalism in Belarus is a hybrid regime, as it covers only half 
of national GDP. It is proved by such metrics like share of state-owned enterprises 
to GDP, the share of employment at state-owned enterprises, and the share of state-
owned banks in banking system assets and capital.
The evaluation of state capitalism efficiency in Belarus based on economic 
growth provides contradictive results (Table 1). There was stable economic growth 
in Belarus above global average in 1996–2010. The main economic drivers were on 
the one hand consumption and investment, and on the other hand manufacturing 
and agriculture. The high inflation in that period signaled about misbalancing in 
monetary and external spheres. The current account deficit and rise of gross exter-
nal debt proved that. The IMF holds factors of production responsible for 70% (of 
which capital created 55% and labor 45%) of growth in output, while productivity 
came in at around 23% [12]. Other calculations estimate the average contribution of 
capital to growth from 2006 to 2012 to be 98.3%, accompanied by capacity utiliza-
tion at 8.3%, labor at −5.3%, and productivity at −1.4% [13].
In the last decade, economic growth was trapped in the long-term anemia 
around 1% average per year. The role of manufacturing and agriculture in pushing 
the economic growth decreased with the rise of service sectors. The improve-
ments in financial stability and external balances have happened in recent years. 
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They provided proper environment to increase the quality of capital in Belarusian 
economy, but not its necessary quantity. The economic anemia can be explained by 
taking a closer look at the traps facing Belarusian state capitalism.
3. State capitalism traps in Belarus
3.1 The “debt trap”
The “debt trap” appears when old debts are converted into new ones. As 
American economist Irving Fisher put it at the time of the Great Depression, “the 
more debtors pay, the more they owe.” The same happens in Belarus. Belarus’ 
external government debt is not repaid with proceeds from its use, and is partially 
refinanced, being shifted to the future. Non-project-related government loans 
are used to replenish reserves, to refinance old debts, and do not generate foreign 
exchange proceeds through exports and foreign direct investments.
Due to the nature of state capitalism in Belarus, “debt trap” appeared on the road 
of country’s development. The problems with business plan appraisal and monitor-
ing, project-related external government loans and guarantees do not always gener-
ate foreign exchange proceeds either, and are sometimes repaid by the budget rather 
than by the projects. In turn, external debt refinancing with the more expensive 
domestic debt leads to an increase in the size of the aggregate government debt and 
an outflow of foreign exchange from the country, due to the weakening of banks’ 
resource base and the declining foreign exchange savings of households.
“Debt trap” is locking when the debt rule is broken—“government loans should 
stimulate economic growth, and the rate of economic growth should exceed that of 
government debt.” In 2015–2016, the increase in the government debt in Belarus was 
accompanied by a fall in its GDP. As a result, the ratio of government debt to GDP 
increased in Belarus from 22.3% as of 1 January 2015 to 39.4% as of 1 January 2017. 
But, in view of the fact that Belarusian government debt is mainly denominated 
in foreign currency, the key indicators for payments related thereto include net 
1996–
2000
2001–
2005
2006–
2010
2011–
2015
2016–
2019
GDP growth 6.3 7.5 7.3 1.2 1.1
GDP growth, global 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.4
Consumer price index growth 128.5 25.7 10.4 35.0 6.7
Current account deficit to GDP −4.1 −2.3 −9.3 −6.3 −1.7
Gross external debt to GDP 15.8 22.5 33.4 51.6 44.2
Consumption to GDP 78.0 77.1 70.5 64.2 71.4
Investment to GDP 25.2 25.6 28.9 35.1 27.9
Net exports of goods and services to 
GDP
−4.1 −2.2 −8.6 −0.1 0.5
Manufacturing to GDP 28.4 26.8 26.2 23.0 21.0
Agriculture and forestry to GDP 13.1 9.3 8.5 7.3 7.0
Construction to GDP 5.6 6.2 8.9 8.4 5.4
Transportation and communications 
to GDP
10.8 9.8 8.5 8.8 10.9
Trade and food services to GDP 8.6 9.8 10.9 13.8 11.3
Table 1. 
Average annual macroeconomic statistics for Belarus, % [10, 11].
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exports, foreign direct investment, and the ability to attract new loans. When the 
first two parameters decrease, the main focus becomes new loans.
“Debt trap” brings to default when the inflow of new loans stops. It is symbolic 
that in economic theory this point is called the “Minsky Moment,” after American 
economist Hyman Minsky, the son of Belarusian emigrants, who took the surname 
Minsky in honor of the city of Minsk upon their arrival in the USA. According to 
his theory, which regained its popularity after the 2008 mortgage crisis in the USA, 
there are three types of borrowers. Those belonging to the first type hedge their 
risks, manage flows, and can avoid default. Those of the second type are only able to 
pay interest on loans but cannot repay the principal amount. The third type cannot 
rely on their cash flows, but only on the growing value of their assets. The “Minsky 
Moment” comes when the asset value stops growing.
Belarus as a borrower can be superficially classified under the first type. But it 
has a specific feature, and if this is factored in, Belarus moves closer to the second 
type of borrower. Faced with a limited range of external creditors, Belarus de facto 
focused on borrowing from a single creditor in recent years. The new external loans 
mobilized from Russian banks, the EAEC Fund and the Government of Russia, are 
actually controlled by one creditor. It narrows the space for maneuver in govern-
ment debt management and creates new risks. The worst thing in case of problems 
with several creditors is a default and the loss of access to the international financial 
market for 3 to 4 years; with one creditor it is a matter of sovereignty.
Until 2012, Belarus attracted resources from international markets, although these 
transactions were often predetermined, that is, Belarusian and Russian banks often 
bought sovereign bonds. After 2012, almost all non-project-related government loans 
were extended for political reasons. At the same time, government debt management 
instruments, such as syndicated loans, issuance of municipal, corporate bonds in 
foreign markets, and so on, were practically never used. In 2017, Belarus once again 
tapped the international financial market, issuing its Eurobonds worth USD 1.4 billion 
to refinance old debts and somewhat diversify the pool of its external creditors. In 
June 2020, Belarus issued sovereign Eurobonds with the amount of USD 1.25 billion.
It is important to note that access to refinancing is generally linked both to 
economic development and to non-economic factors like overall confidence in the 
borrower. The problems developing countries have refinancing external debt are 
therefore of particular interest.
a. Background problems with refinancing (default, or the inability or unwilling-
ness to make debt payments): developing countries see refinancing problems 
start to occur on average when external debt reaches 69.3% of GDP [14]. Most 
often (in 32.3% of instances) they happen when external debt ranges from 41 
to 60% of GDP, while in 19.4% of cases it is when external debt is below 40% 
of GDP, 16% when it is between 61 and 80%, 16% when it is between 81 and 
100%, and 16% when it exceeds 100%. The threshold for when a country starts 
to have problems refinancing external debt can therefore be said with a high 
degree of accuracy to be when existing debt is around 60% of GDP. The ceiling, 
similarly, seems to be 100%.
b. Fallout following default: the main consequences of default are a drop in inves-
tor confidence, a lowered sovereign credit rating, and temporary exclusion 
from international financial markets. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 
looked at 169 defaults from 1946 to 2008 and found that it takes countries 3 
years on average to move past defaults (again begin to attract foreign loans) 
[14]. Interestingly, that period seems to be shrinking: from 1800 to 1945 it 
took countries an average of 6 years to get past 127 defaults. It is also worth 
remembering that defaults have on occasion led to war. For example, there 
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were wars between the UK and Egypt in 1882, the UK and Turkey in 1876, the 
US and Venezuela in the middle of the 1890s, and the US and Haiti in 1915. The 
primary objective in each of those cases was to establish military control over 
customs in order to collect currency as payment for foreign debt.
Given that the primary source of the “debt trap” facing the Belarusian economy 
is the state capitalism system, opening up the economy to foreign capital and 
stimulating private investment is the way out of this pitfall.
3.2 The “middle-income trap”
The “middle-income trap,” also called the “development trap”—term introduced 
by the World Bank economists I. Gill and H. Kharas [15]. This trap occurs when rising 
salaries no longer lead to country-fast development as measured by GDP per capita 
(GNI per capita, Atlas) and the country finds itself trapped on par with other middle-
income countries. The borders of the “middle-income trap” start from 1006 USD till 
12,235 USD of GNI per capita [16]. Others use nominal GDP per capita to estimate 
“middle-income trap” in the limits of 10,000 dollars to 15,000 USD [17] or real GDP 
per capita (purchasing power parity) from 5000 USD to 10,000 USD [18]. There is also 
the method to compare developing countries’ GDP per capital with the same US’ indica-
tor and to use it as the share from 5 to 45% to make conclusions about the pitfall [19].
Using Atlas methodology, it was found out that Belarus got into the “middle-
income trap” since its independence and has been there for almost three decades. In 
2007, Belarus moved from the group of lower middle-income countries to the group 
of upper middle-income countries with GNI per capita more than 3956 USD. But 
it did not go out and made reverse from the exit in 2014, staying in this upper level 
trap already more than 10 years [20]. The other countries which got into “middle-
income” pitfall have been staying there more than 5 years (39 out of 55 countries in 
the period from 1989 till 2016), and more than 20 years (15 out of 55 countries in 
the same period). The cases of Russia, Croatia, and Equatorial Guinea prove that 
countries can go back to the “middle-income trap,” even if they left it before.
There are several reasons why Belarus is trapped in the “middle-income” pitfall.
1. An export-oriented economy
From 2009 to 2018, 31.3% of manufactured goods and services were exported, 
with that number climbing to 36.6% for 2016 and 36.1% in 2018 [10]. At the same 
time, the rising cost of labor resources has cut into profits and sabotaged Belarusian 
competitiveness as compared to countries coupling similar technology with cheaper 
labor. More importantly, however, those countries themselves are undergoing struc-
tural reforms, improving their markets, and developing their institutions, with the 
effect of entrenching their competitiveness.
2. Fading innovation
A lack of spending on research and development, innovation funds that are some-
times not used for their intended purpose, and an overall lack of stimulus for the 
development of innovation keep Belarusian exporters from focusing on reducing 
costs and boosting quality in an effort to improve their competitiveness. For ex-
ample, the share of expenses devoted to R&D by Belarusian exporters (the Minsk 
Tractor Works, BelAZ) is several times lower than that of their competitors (John 
Deer, Caterpillar). In absolute dollar terms, they are outspent thousands of times 
over. Moreover, Belarusian companies invest in imported technology, while their 
foreign competitors invest in their own technology. Firms in Belarus purchase high 
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quality, if imported equipment that needs to be update 5–10 years later, meaning 
that they have to again spend the money to purchase foreign tech. That all intensi-
fies the Belarusian race to improve on old technology and leaves no room for com-
panies to create new, cutting-edge technology of their own. Technological progress, 
in short, stalls. The level of R&D expenditures to GDP is rather low. It declined 
from 0.96% in 2007 to 0.49% in 2015 and the increased to 0.6% in 2018.
The situation with innovation in Belarus has also devalued how people look at 
research and scientists by chronically underfunding them and leaving their skills 
unneeded and unwanted. Young doctors of science in Belarus are few and far be-
tween. In 2011 and 2012, there was not a single one in the country under the age of 
29. There were 3 and 4, respectively, under the age of 39, 39 and 29 aged 40–49, 71 
and 62 aged 50–54, and 114 and 112 aged 55–59 [21].
The IT industry’s popularity in Belarus neither compensates for the lack of innova-
tion in the real sector nor contributes to overall labor productivity. Instead, the flow 
of qualified workers moving to IT from the manufacturing industry sacrifices pro-
ductivity in the latter without a corresponding boost for the former. But IT as the 
self-sufficient and export-oriented industry (separated from the rest of the econ-
omy) provides rather successful case in Belarus. In 2017, new legislature reloaded 
High-Tech Park with new tax benefits and state guarantees. As the result, in 2019 IT 
sector contributed 6.5% to GDP, and 5.2% to total export of goods and services.
3. Low labor productivity
Salary growth over the long term in Belarus exceeds labor productivity growth 
multiple times over. For example, from 2000 to 2014, real wages grew 4.8 times, 
while productivity only grew 2.2 times. From 2010 to 2014, real wages grew 45%; 
productivity was held to only 14% growth.
Admittedly, labor productivity at Belarusian state-owned firms is lower than at 
their private and foreign competitors. In 2013, revenue per employee at the joint 
venture MAN factory was 360,000 dollars compared to 64,300 dollars at the 
Minsk Automobile Plant (6 times higher); at John Deer it was 11 times higher 
compared to the Minsk Tractor Works; at foreign owned Olivaria Brewery it 
was 190,700 dollars compared to 85,000 dollars at state-owned Krinitsa (half as 
much); at private Santa Bremor it was 115,900 dollars compared to 83,700 dollars 
at state-owned Belryba. It is worth noting that the difference in productivity goes 
beyond technology, a metric according to which state enterprises are comparable 
to their competitors after modernization; different management systems—man-
ual versus corporate, for instance—explain the difference.
Belarus can therefore get away from the “middle-income trap” by utilizing 
systemic and operational measures.
a. Systemic measures, which wield a long-term effect, include altering the country’s 
economy structure, accelerating innovative development, and taking steps to 
boost labor productivity, primarily at state-owned firms. Management systems 
could be improved, for example, by implementing IT in the manufacturing 
industry. The necessity of maintaining living standards for Belarusians makes it 
imperative to compete with other countries for international capital by improving 
the institutional and entrepreneurial environment rather than cutting labor costs.
b. Operational measures, which enlarge the labor pool in the short term, include 
pension reform, getting more women and disabled people into the economy, 
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liberalizing immigration policy, and reducing prison sentences (for example, 
for non-violent crimes).
3.3 The “social burden trap”
Belarusian state capitalism has always had the support and understanding of the 
people as a form of socialism, or a welfare state. Since the 1990s, especially when 
contrasted to the social turbulence experienced in neighboring countries, Belarusian 
society held onto a degree of nostalgia for the relatively successful social and eco-
nomic development Belarus had grown accustomed to as part of the Soviet Union.
And nowadays the government and its limited resources are torn between 
satisfying the country’s growing social needs and solving its economic problems. 
It generally chooses to prioritize the former at the cost of economic growth. That 
high level of social spending coupled with the “debt trap” and “middle-income 
trap” is calling into question whether the social welfare system will be financed in 
the future by the government, the people, or other sources of income. At the same 
time, a population that has grown accustomed to today’s level of income and social 
benefits as subsidized by the government expects more of the same.
It is important to also note that the purchasing power of wages in Belarus is higher 
than its face value in dollars. That can be explained by the partial subsidies the gov-
ernment provides for consumer prices, utilities, and social services. While nominal 
wages in Belarus are lower, for example, than in Russia and Kazakhstan, in terms of 
purchasing power parity they have been higher in recent years than in Kazakhstan.
The growth in and level of salaries in Belarus should be juxtaposed with the 
approaches taken by other countries, for example, to financing utilities or a number 
of other social expenses aimed at boosting the national economy’s competitiveness.
3.3.1 Utilities
The government provides a utility subsidy of nearly 70%, and there are plenty of 
counter-arguments to the impending elimination of cross subsidies.
First, and given the state monopoly in this area leaving consumers bereft of 
choices when it comes to which utilities they use and pay for, the key issue is to 
control expenses and therefore rates.
Second, raising rates would increase the percentage of private expenses taken 
up by utilities. In the first quarter of 2015, utilities accounted for 6.9% of household 
expenses in Belarus. By way of comparison, in 2012 that number was 6.8% in Russia 
and 9.9% on average in Europe, with the lowest being 3.5% in Finland and the 
highest being 14% in Slovakia [22]. In other words, completely eliminating cross 
subsidies in Belarus would be justified given were it to occur in the context of an 
increase in private earnings.
Third, utility rates are included in the consumer price index, so raising them would 
have a trickle-down effect that pushes inflation higher across the entire economy. 
Doing so therefore needs to be gradual in an effort to avoid an inflationary shock.
3.3.2 Social support
Social expenditures on, for example, supporting families are higher in Belarus 
than in other countries. For instance, paid maternity leave in Belarus is 3 years, 
while in Russia, it is 1.5 years and in Kazakhstan, it is 1 year. The one-time grant 
given at childbirth is 961 USD in Belarus for the first child and 1345 USD for 
all following children. In Russia, it is 261 USD; in Poland, it is 266 USD; and in 
Lithuania, it is 469 USD. In Kazakhstan, parents are paid 319 USD for each of 
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their first three children, receiving 53.2 USD for all subsequent children. In 2015, 
Belarus introduced family capital in the amount of 10,000 USD made avail-
able after the birth of third and following children. In Russia, maternity capital 
comes to 8160 USD, while there is no state-sponsored maternity capital system in 
Kazakhstan, Poland, or Lithuania.
There is no need to limit the search for ways social spending can be financed 
to some sort of split between the government and consumers—business could 
also prove to be an important source. However, social spending is usually seen 
in the business world as a burden imposed by the government in the form of a 
minimum wage, educational standards, medical standards, and more. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, the business model in vogue was to minimize social expenditures by 
manufacturing in countries with the lowest social requirements and standards: 
China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries, for instance.
In Belarus, one strategy for privately owned construction companies is to build 
kindergartens into their new apartment complexes and hand them over to the local 
authorities, thereby adding to the incentive to buy their apartments. The cost of 
building the kindergartens is even built into the price of the apartments. Another 
example is when companies build roads to their shopping centers, business centers, 
and entertainment complexes. All of that goes back to a business model focused on 
stimulating demand for goods and services rather than charity paid by business to 
finance the state’s social infrastructure.
Ultimately, one way out of the “social burden trap” (besides wholesale welfare 
reform) is a public-private partnership that is both mutually beneficial and vol-
untary, a qualification without which it would drag business into an unprofitable 
social sphere and come to nothing. Most practical would be the creation of a fund 
supported by private, state, and international capital that could be used to finance 
the public-private partnership’s social projects (by offering targeted business loans 
at discounted rates, for instance).
3.4 The “resource curse trap”
This trap occurs when the economy, and in particular exports, is based on 
preferential access to raw materials, forcing it into dependence on external factors 
(global prices, foreign trading partners, and competitors) and industries not based 
on raw materials into the background. Favorable conditions see exports and the 
economy grow, digging themselves deeper and deeper into the hole in the process, 
while economic downturns lead to falling exports, economic growth, and living 
standards. Free or preferential access to raw materials also saps the state’s need for 
tax revenue and strong institutions. When the economy takes a turn for the worse 
and the prices for raw materials drop, institutions and tax revenue are not there to 
continue stable economic development.
This pitfall is a real and present danger for the Belarusian economy due to the 
petrochemical sector’s outsized presence and the Russian factor.
3.4.1 The petrochemical sector
The petrochemical industry exploited a period of low crude oil prices and high 
prices on finished products to boost its share of the country’s GDP. In 2009, oil refining 
and chemical production created 4.7% of GDP; in 2019, they created around 7%. Raw 
materials also became more of the country’s focus when it came to exports. For exam-
ple, the share of oil, petroleum products, and potash fertilizers in Belarusian exports 
went from 35% in 2010 to 38% in 2014. And even within that number oil and petroleum 
products went from 26 to 30%, while potash fertilizers dropped from 9 to 8%.
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Falling global potassium prices in 2013–2014 and oil prices in 2014–2015 (a trend 
that will most likely be deep and protracted) coupled with a lesser fall in prices 
for petroleum products necessitates a new economic structure for Belarus. A fast 
bounce-back of global oil prices and a return to the old national economic structure 
are an unlikelihood not borne out by knowledge of history. The average historical 
oil price (in terms of the dollar’s value in 2000) from 1880 to 2004 was 19.61 USD 
per barrel [23]. The historic highs enjoyed by the global economy have been a recent 
phenomenon: in 2010–2014, Brent crude averaged 102 dollars per barrel, creating an 
unsustainable bubble in the economies of a number of countries. The dramatic drop 
in oil prices has also had an impact on both production quantities and the financial 
wellbeing of oil refineries that are Belarus’ largest exports and taxpayers and in 
the middle of modernization. In 2013, the share of exports taken up by goods and 
services provided by Mozyr Oil Refinery and Naftan was 16%.
On the other hand, the impact dropping crude oil prices have had on the 
Belarusian oil refinery sector should not be overstated. Prices on crude are cor-
related with prices on oil refinery goods, so the net profit brought in by oil refineries 
should remain more or less the same. Efficiency, rather than price changes, is a 
much heftier driver of profits, and decreased export customs duties have been the 
biggest difference the oil price drop has had on the Belarusian refining sector.
3.4.2 The Russian factor
Russia’s oil-based economic structure, the formation of the Eurasian 
Economic Space, and the orientation of 43% as of 2019 Belarusian exports 
toward the Russian market make the Russian factor a critical piece of the puzzle. 
In 2019, oil was responsible for 48% of import from Russia to Belarus, adding gas 
pushes that number to 68%, and adding metals means that the overall share of 
raw materials came to 78%.
Given the Russian ruble’s floating rate, the global collapses of oil prices in 
2014–2015, and early 2020 were mirrored almost exactly by the exchange rate. The 
Russian ruble has been de facto pegged to the price of oil. Certainly, the plummet-
ing price of oil has not been the only factor exerting downward pressure on the 
Russian ruble. Countries like Angola, Algeria, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria, all 
with a higher oil exports to GDP ratio than Russia, saw their currencies devalue less 
dramatically than the Russian ruble in 2014–2015.
The weakening Russian ruble has a corresponding effect on the competi-
tiveness of Belarusian exports to Russia. Not only that, but given the floating 
Belarusian ruble rate, the fact that the Russian ruble is in the Belarusian currency 
basket, and the close economic relationship between Belarus and Russia, changing 
global oil prices affect the value of the Belarusian ruble as well via currency and 
trade channels.
All in all, the Belarusian economy’s post-Soviet structure, its overbearing focus 
on the raw materials of the petrochemical and potassium sector, and its close ties 
to the raw materials-based Russian economy creates the framework for a fall into 
the “resource curse trap.” Norway is a textbook example of how to get out of that 
trap, as the oil and gas sector there is responsible for more than 50% of the country’s 
export revenue. Even so, it has maintained stable economic growth—while raw 
materials and the role they play in exports is an important factor in the country’s 
economic growth, they are not the determining factor. The main difference is 
that institutions were built in Norway before raw materials were developed on an 
industrial scale (before the 1970s), making it immune to external shocks today. The 
way out of the resource curse pitfall, ultimately, means going back to the necessity 
of institutional reform.
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3.5 The “conflict neighbors trap”
The “conflict neighbors trap” term was coined by Paul Collier to describe how 
countries surrounded by neighbors in conflict fall into the long-term trap of inhibited 
economic growth [24]. His study showed that, on average, countries benefit from 
the economic growth of their neighbors: each point of growth adds 0.4% to the GDP 
of neighboring countries, though for African countries that number is 0.2% and for 
non-African countries it is 0.7%. Political crisis in a country also results in economic 
losses both for it and for its neighbors totaling an average of 100 billion dollars. The 
origin of political conflict was also proven to be slow economic growth or contrac-
tion in many instances. For example, 5 years of non-existent economic growth leads 
to political crisis and civil war in 14% of cases. Each point of growth or contraction 
improves or lowers the odds of a political crisis occurring. If an economy contracts by 
3%, for instance, the likelihood of a crisis happening rises to more than 16%. It was 
also shown that the longer an economy contracts, the longer it takes to dig itself out 
of the resulting political crisis. A crisis that culminates in civil war lasts an average 
of around 5 years, and countries that go through a civil war have a 50% chance of 
experiencing another one within the next decade. Economies suffering from civil war 
contract by an average of 2.3% per year, pulling their neighbors down with them.
The results of Collier’s study have an analogy in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, 
the civil war in Ukraine, the 2014–2015 recession, the 2016–2019 slow recovery in 
Russia, and their impact on the Belarusian economy. Given the territorial losses 
suffered by Ukraine as well as the human cost of the conflict, a fast resolution to 
the bilateral conflict looks anything but likely. Taking into the account the con-
sequences of 2020’s coronavirus, it is hard to make predictions when Russia will 
return to growth. While prognoses differ, they share a similar trend: for each point 
Russian GDP contracts, estimates concur that Belarusian GDP will lose 0.6% of 
growth thanks to the net-export effect [25].
Before moving on it is important to note that Russia and Ukraine are not simply 
neighbors of Belarus; they are its primary trade and investment partners. And they 
stay like this through the years, despite their economic recessions or recoveries. 
In 2019, the share of Belarusian exports of goods to Russian market of total was 
43%, and to Ukrainian market—11%. The share of import from Russian of total in 
Belarus was 62%, and from Ukraine—5%. The share of foreign direct investments 
from Russia of total to Belarus was 69%, and from Ukraine—1%.
There are two ways out of this trap for the Belarusian economy: reorientation 
toward the domestic market or diversifying into other foreign markets.
1. Reorienting the economy from foreign markets to the domestic market
While this may be a tempting solution, from January to March 2015 the share of 
Belarusian sales in the domestic retail market came to 68.9%. For foodstuffs, that 
number was higher, at 81.6%, and for non-foodstuffs, it was 50.9%. The domestic 
market is simply not capable of completely replacing the volume of sales lost in 
foreign markets without increasing capacity.
Generally speaking, a reorientation toward domestic markets is generally part of 
a temporary import substitution strategy geared toward protecting from external 
competition.
The main argument in favor of import substitution is the need to temporarily 
shelter high-potential industries or companies from competition. However, in 
that case the sheltered industry has to use that opportunity to outpace the devel-
opment of its foreign competitors (by cutting production costs faster, for ex-
ample), coming out the other side having made up most of the ground separating 
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them. Developing countries often point to examples where developed countries 
employed import substitution (the US, Germany, and Japan in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries) to, in their opinion, distance themselves from develop-
ing countries over the long term [26] .
Opponents of import substitution bring up the difficulty of deciding which 
prioritized industries should be protected [27]. Often the obvious choice for 
the government is looked at askance by private businesses that have invested 
elsewhere. At that point, the industry is prioritized by the administration and a 
temporary import substitution policy becomes permanent. Inflation is also a re-
sult of import substitution, as prices for both imported (thanks to new protective 
measures) and domestic goods rise. When that happens, national manufacturers 
often lower the prices they charge in foreign markets and compensate for the lost 
revenue by boosting them domestically.
2. Diversification of foreign markets
The focus Belarusian exports have fixed in the last few years on Russia and Ukraine 
has less to do with left-over post-Soviet relationships and more to do with their lack 
of competitiveness and lagging technological development. Belarus’ concentration 
on its largest export Russian market has grown in recent years: from 37% of total 
exports in 2011 to 39% in 2015, and to 43% in 2019. Import is even more concen-
trated on Russia. During last decade, import from Russia to Belarus stayed more or 
less at the same level: 64% of total imports in 2011, 62% in 2015, and 62% in 2019.
The problems Russia and Ukraine experienced in 2014–2015 have limited Belarus’ 
export options. That would logically encourage a switch to other markets, but there 
Belarusian exports are less competitive. The situation is exacerbated by the lack of 
innovation in Belarusian exports. For example, the country’s exporters (the Minsk 
Automobile Plant and the Minsk Tractor Works) do not have research centers 
abroad they can lean on for market analysis and forecasts, to learn about customer 
needs, and to tweak technology and manufacturing. Competitors like John Deer 
and MAN have R&D centers in Germany (100 employees), France (120 employ-
ees), China, India, and the US. A systemic solution to the problem would be to move 
from a resource-based economic model to an investment-based model by attracting 
foreign direct investment, and from there creating a domestic culture of innovation.
The “conflict neighbor trap” often centers on the medium term with a likelihood 
of repeat occurrences in the long term, given that long periods of poor economic 
growth can lead to social unrest. The best way out of this trap for Belarus is to 
attract foreign direct investments in export companies focusing on highly competi-
tive and high-tech markets.
3.6 “The forceful pressure trap”
This trap means that due to the state capitalism management system in 
Belarus, government and control agencies are deeply involved in business activi-
ties of business enterprises. Year by year, this administrative burden becomes 
forceful pressure on business and the barrier for economic growth. Being the 
part of the system, control agencies cannot stop the pressure by themselves. 
So they bring economy to almost complete stop as the enterprises try to avoid 
making mistakes in following norms and legislature and being punished. The 
state forceful pressure takes the forms of meetings, inspections, and court cases 
against business.
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1. Meetings
A survey of 800 directors of Belarusian firms run in 2013 by the Economy Re-
search Institute of the Ministry of Economy found that 71% of those surveyed 
spend at least 20% of each week (one working day) on meetings with state agen-
cies, the main topic of which, 91% say, is discussing their revenues, profits, and 
other indicators. With that in mind, private firms more and more prefer to avoid 
contact with the government in an effort to avoid that administrative pressure.
2. Inspections
According to the Association of Retail Networks, in 2014–2015, there has been an 
uptick in the number of inspections conducted by the Ministry of Trade. Traded 
goods themselves are also subject to inspection by the State Control Committee, 
several departments in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry for Emer-
gency Situations, the Ministry for Taxes and Levies, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Protection, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protec-
tion, the State Committee for Standardization, local authorities, and other moni-
toring and law enforcement agencies. Although the process is legally regulated, 
the administrative burden pushes operational costs higher for businesses.
3. Court cases
In 2015, some evident coercive pressure on the economy emerged in the form of 
an increased number of court cases dealing with administrative offenses in the 
economic sphere. According to the Supreme Court, the number of cases increased 
from 9792 in 2014 to 13,361 in 2015. Along with that, the major contributors to 
the coercive pressure on the national economy in 2014 and 2015 were the Ministry 
of Taxes and Duties—correspondingly 6804 and 9060 cases, the State Customs 
Committee—466 and 651 cases, the Ministry of Internal Affairs—446 and 415 
cases, and the State Control Committee—357 and 398 cases.
In addition, there has been a rise in the percentage of cases resulting in admin-
istrative penalties to the overall number of cases filed in court: a total of 88% in 
2014 and 90% in 2015, including cases related to the Ministry of Taxes and Du-
ties—91 and 92%, the State Control Committee—85 and 88%, the State Customs 
Committee—47 and 73%, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs—69 and 66%. 
Only a few appeals were satisfied in whole or in part against the action or inac-
tion of officials and verification of legality. Moreover, the number of appeals has 
been decreasing since 2013. A total of 102 decisions were challenged in court as 
appeals against actions of officials of the Ministry of Taxes and Duties in 2013; 12 
claims were satisfied in whole or in part. In 2015, the corresponding figures were 
78 and 6. Regarding the State Customs Committee, the numbers were 168 and 78 
in 2013, and 112 and 6 in 2015.
A year-long comparison of the overall quantity of initiated criminal cases related 
to economic offenses shows a steady increase in the number: 2129 cases in 2012, 
2639 in 2013, 2867 in 2014, and 3580 in 2015. The number of administrative 
cases related to economic offenses has also been growing: 111,421 cases in 2012, 
121,052 in 2013, 121,371 in 2014, and 128,005 in 2015.
For Belarus, getting out of this trap means decentralizing state regulation of the 
economy as well as strengthening and promoting independence and material incen-
tives for state institutions to bring in result-oriented professionals. Better informa-
tion in addition to more openness and transparency are critical, as are keeping 
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decision-making out of the hands of individuals, engendering trust, and building 
respect. Authority has to be delegated to ministries, departments, and sections in 
keeping with the principle that simpler problems can be solved farther down the 
food chain. Dividing up the regulatory and economic functions of state agencies 
needs to happen, putting ministries in charge of industries and more general areas 
without responsibility for the economy on the micro level.
The state would be wise to deprioritize the letter of the law when it comes 
to monitoring compliance with the rules governing business (something that is 
undoubtedly important in an institutional economy). As it sets up institutions 
and oversees the development of the economy, most important is for Belarus to 
ensure currency and financial stability by prioritizing tax- and currency-related 
crimes (though punishing them cannot be used as a means to other ends). Relaxing 
control, especially over small and medium business, would create space for them to 
experiment, try new approaches and methods, test new suppliers and clients, and 
breathe life into the economy. Once changes have been made to economic struc-
tures, control can be adapted to those new forms and fully reinstated.
4. Public values behind state capitalism in Belarus
State capitalism cannot function in Belarus without public support thanks to 
income equality and moderate income growth. In 1990, the inequality index (GINI 
index from 0 to 1, with 1 signifying extreme inequality) in Belarus was 0.24, in 2000 
it was 0.23, in 2010 it was 0.27, and in 2018 it was 0.25. That number looks even better 
when juxtaposed with those of other countries featuring high levels of state involve-
ment in the economy. For example, in Russia in 1991, it was 0.26 before rising to 0.44 
in 2018; in China, it was 0.33 in 1990 and 0.47 in 2018. While the average monthly sal-
ary in Belarus in the 1990s came to a few tens of dollars, by 2006 it had grown to 271, 
and in 2014, it reached a 25-year high of 595 dollars; in May 2020, it was 476 dollars.
Public support consists of the variety of values, and it is a double-edge sword 
how the values influence on the economy and the economy influences on the values 
in Belarus.
4.1 Influence of values on the economy in state capitalism of Belarus
Belarusian matrix of values’ impact on the economy is complex, both random 
and orderly.
The randomness is expressed in doublethink, swaying between collectivism and 
individualism, emotionality and restraint, the past and the future, short- and long 
term, conservatism, and liberalism [28]. In the theory of behaviorism, the first 
decision is usually considered irrational and incorrect (the so-called “halo effect”), 
while the second one is rational and more accurate. In the case of Belarus, both 
decisions look irrational, and the Belarusian state capitalism itself is akin to a set of 
anomalies. A decision can be affected by the unpredictable specific context, case, 
mood, fatigue, hunger, time of day, previous meeting, another person’s statement, 
personality, association with the surname of the person in question, or something 
else that cannot be foreseen. All these are situational factors of the value matrix. 
Because of constant reflection and adaptation, the national features of psyche and 
local behavioral practices replace the classical economic theory and world practices, 
playing the priority and effective role in the Belarusian state capitalism.
The orderly influence of the Belarusian matrix on the economy is reflected in 
the perceived influence of a range of cultural, economic, and other factors on the 
matrix itself and, thus, on the economy. Such factors are difficult to weigh and 
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prioritize depending on their impact on the Belarusian economy. These are the 
“tectonic plates” of the Belarusian behavioral economics, which overlap and move 
with time. They form the overall information and cultural environment, in which 
decisions are made, the values, which are shared by the public and combine into the 
cultural matrix, the unifying factors, which nowadays make the Belarusian matrix 
Belarusian, distinguishing it from other societies.
The range of valuable factors that orderly influences on Belarusian state capital-
ism includes the following.
Memory of the war: according to a sociological survey of 2013, 89.6% of 
Belarusians called the Great Patriotic War the main historical event for Belarusians 
[29]. The memories and fears of the war trigger the desire to seek protection from a 
strong leader and provide the basement for state capitalism. In 2010–2014, 58% of 
Belarusians worry about the war involving in the country [30]. Belarus preserves 
the inert military mentality of the strong role of the state and paternalism. This 
leads to increased control over businesses, maintaining the traditionally high 
budgetary expenditures on poorly performing enterprises, accompanied by the 
decreasing incomes of the population.
Family orientation: it forms the dualism of collectivism and individualism. 
It narrows the circle of trust, range of partners, limits behavioral practices, and 
restrains social identity. In addition, such features as paternalism and orientation 
to the Soviet past are formed under the influence of Belarusian family orientation. 
During economic slowdown, family values have become stronger. In the period 
of economic growth in 1999–2009, from 78 to 81% Belarusians considered their 
families as very important in life. In 2010–2014 when economic growth declined, 
88% respondents gave that answer [30].
Language: Russian is the main spoken language, the language used for writing 
documents and the language of thought, while the Belarusian language is not so 
popular for many in the country. In 2010–2014, 83.3% of Belarusians speak Russian 
at home, while only 6.5% speak Belarusian [30]. Russian largely determines many 
Belarusian features, for example, the orientation to the Soviet past, hence the orien-
tation to scale, to short-term planning and paternalism, as well as individualism in 
the form of isolation from the rest of the world. The use of the Russian language in 
the Belarusian economy predetermines the orientation of its foreign trade, invest-
ments, and tourism to Russian-speaking partners.
Sense of ownership: in Belarus, the collective memory, orientation to the Soviet 
past, orientation to scale, and paternalism, dull the sense of ownership. It affects 
the public’s attitude to large state-owned enterprises as features of heritage and 
culture, which then constrains their privatization and restructuring. In general, the 
Belarusians sense of ownership is very polarized with no strong attitude toward 
government or private ownership [30].
Fears: in Belarus, phobias explain the roots of state capitalism. The fear of losing 
earnings, say because of their depreciation due to inflation, exceeds the willingness to 
earn more, which creates a greater propensity to save than to invest. The fear of losing 
a job with a change of owner, following the example of Russia in the 1990s, creates a 
cautious attitude toward privatization. In 2010–2014, 56% of Belarusians were afraid 
of losing their jobs [30]. The fear of the future and disappointment in the present 
forms the orientation to the past in the search for answers. The fear of punishment, 
both inherited and learned, serves as a habitual motivation in the paternalistic regime.
4.2 Influence of the economic anemia/growth on the public values in Belarus
Recent economic anemia in Belarus has transformed public values. It no longer 
raises the question how the state capitalism restores the high level of economic 
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growth in Belarus. Now it faces new dilemma if the state capitalism is capable of 
doing that. If public values behind economic anemia have changed dramatically, 
then it would mean that the issue of state capitalism efficiency has moved from 
economic to sociological and political fields of science.
Belarusian’s public values could be compared in different time periods of 
economic growth and economic anemia (Table 2). There is no strong evidence that 
people are looking for solutions of economic problems in the ownership of busi-
ness. More likely they see other reasons of economic anemia in Belarus rather than 
private vs. state ownership of business, as the two are interconnected in the country. 
Moreover, Belarusians prefer the government to take more responsibility during 
hard times and less the people themselves. When economic growth is high, people 
also have high confidence in the government. But when economic growth is low, the 
public confidence in the government is decreasing. So it is easy to see that economic 
growth fluctuations in Belarus are reflected in the public opinion on the responsibil-
ity of the government and its state capitalism.
Some more observations of Belarusians public values behind economic 
anemia could be added that influence on the business climate and the health of 
society. So important for economic growth trust is decreasing during economic 
slowdown. In 2010–2014, the answer “most people can be trusted” has been 
decreased from 41 to 33%, and the answer “need to be very careful” has been 
1994–
1998
1999–
2004
2005–
2009
2010–
2014
GDP growth, average % 0.1 5.18 7.68 3.52
Private vs. state ownership 
of business
Private ownership 
should be increased
8 9 8 11
Medium 22 23 26 21
Government 
ownership should be 
increased
18 8 4 6
Responsibility: 
government vs. people
People should take 
more responsibility
5 12 12 4
Medium 5 19 19 5
Government 
should take more 
responsibility
29 16 6 23
Confidence: the 
government
A great deal, quite a lot 47 Not 
available
60 56
Not very much, not 
at all
46 Not 
available
30 43
Political system: having a 
strong leader
Very good, fairly good 49 34 62 47
Bad, very bad 39 50 25 52
Political system: having 
experts make decision
Very good, fairly good 44 63 52 56
Bad, very bad 34 17 30 42
Political system: having 
the army rule
Very good, fairly good 12 16 13 9
Bad, very bad 74 69 72 91
Political system: having 
democracy
Very good, fairly good 66 67 72 85
Bad, very bad 16 8 9 15
Table 2. 
Public values and economic growth in Belarus, % of total respondents [30].
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increased from 50 to 60%. The values of such qualities like tolerance and respect 
for other people has become less important during economic anemia falling from 
64 to 61% in 2010–2014 [30].
Economic anemia in state capitalism transforms public attitude toward political 
system (Table 2). In the case of Belarus, the popularity of strong leader political 
system has been decreasing during low economic growth. People increase their 
good attitude to the experts making decision political system, but not so much. 
When Belarusian’s state capitalism tries to use force pressure to solve economic 
problems, it also makes political system ruled by army absolutely unpopular. 
Finally, the main transformation of public values behind economic anemia is the 
strong rise of popularity toward democratic political system. It brings the doubts 
about the future of the current mode of state capitalism in Belarus without reforms.
5. Conclusions
Belarusian state capitalism is the hybrid regime of transition economy. Currently 
it covers only half of GDP, half of employment, and around 60% of banking assets 
and banking capital. It is based on the high level of public expenditures to GDP, 
medium level of tax burden, and wide range of state-owned enterprises. There are 
plenty of underdeveloped financial instruments in Belarus that could support its 
state capitalism nowadays, like banking system, financial market, monetization of 
GDP, and foreign direct investments.
In 1996–2010, state capitalism boosted high economic growth in Belarus on the 
level of average 7% per year. But it was also accompanied by high inflation, current 
account deficit, and currency crises. In 2011–2019, Belarus faced some traps on the 
way of its economic growth: “debt trap,” “middle-income trap,” “social burden trap,” 
“resource curse trap,” “conflict neighbors trap,” and “forceful pressure trap.” They 
all lead to the economic anemia in the country on the level of a little more than 1% 
per year during last decade.
Belarusian state capitalism exists because of public support, based on economic 
equality, and the rise of incomes. During economic growth such public values like 
the memory of the war, family orientation, language, sense of ownership, and vari-
ous phobias supported state capitalism in Belarus. But, during economic anemia, 
the fall of incomes, the public attitude to political system has changed dramatically 
and brought state capitalism existence to new crossroads.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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